Shuttle Docs
  • Trusted Execution Environments
    • Confidentiality
    • Execution Integrity
    • Remote Attestation
    • Threat Models
    • Side-Channel Attacks
    • Side-Channel Attack Mitigation
    • Model Types
  • Foreword
    • Shuttle
  • Solution #1
    • Blockchain | Framework Alignment
    • Enarx
    • Web Assembly System Interface(WASI)
  • Solution #2
    • Attestation
      • SGX DCAP
      • Intel Trust Authority
    • Decentralizing Attestation
      • It’s Butterfree!
      • Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure(DPKI)
      • Our Tool: Cryptographic Accumulator
      • Re-attestation
  • Blockchain
    • Reducing Computational Overhead
    • Ekiden
    • Verifier's Dilemma
    • Independent Layers
    • Security of Enclaves & Consensus
    • Non-Byzantine Computation
      • Discrepancy Detection - Good Idea Oasis!
    • Roughtime
  • Avalanche
    • Multi-dimensional Fees
    • Stakeless?
  • Privacy
    • Confidential Blockchain
    • Secret Network Vulnerability - 2022
  • Summary
    • Market Potential
    • Cosmos, Polkadot, Avalanche
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  1. Trusted Execution Environments

Threat Models

All Digital State Observer(ADSO):

An ADSO adversary can monitor all digital states within a processor, including all intermediate states within enclaves, which may be exposed through known or even yet undiscovered side channels.

Abstract TEE model:

The threats that the abstract TEE model are robust against include basically everything outside the CPU chip packaging boundary. Adversaries are allowed to have control of the operating system (and hypervisor, if used)—even the boot ROMs—and could read and write the contents of DRAM at will while the CPU is executing. The adversaries are not, however, allowed access to the CPU’s internal state: register values, architectural or otherwise; branch prediction table contents; on-chip cache contents; etc

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Last updated 6 months ago