Shuttle Docs
  • Trusted Execution Environments
    • Confidentiality
    • Execution Integrity
    • Remote Attestation
    • Threat Models
    • Side-Channel Attacks
    • Side-Channel Attack Mitigation
    • Model Types
  • Foreword
    • Shuttle
  • Solution #1
    • Blockchain | Framework Alignment
    • Enarx
    • Web Assembly System Interface(WASI)
  • Solution #2
    • Attestation
      • SGX DCAP
      • Intel Trust Authority
    • Decentralizing Attestation
      • It’s Butterfree!
      • Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure(DPKI)
      • Our Tool: Cryptographic Accumulator
      • Re-attestation
  • Blockchain
    • Reducing Computational Overhead
    • Ekiden
    • Verifier's Dilemma
    • Independent Layers
    • Security of Enclaves & Consensus
    • Non-Byzantine Computation
      • Discrepancy Detection - Good Idea Oasis!
    • Roughtime
  • Avalanche
    • Multi-dimensional Fees
    • Stakeless?
  • Privacy
    • Confidential Blockchain
    • Secret Network Vulnerability - 2022
  • Summary
    • Market Potential
    • Cosmos, Polkadot, Avalanche
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  1. Solution #2

Decentralizing Attestation

Our Terminology:

Evidence: claims signed by the TEE instance, binding together the state of the TEE, the identity of the code running in it, and application level data (usually public keys); produced by the TEE instance at runtime.

Endorsements: additional data used to establish the trustworthiness of the evidence (e.g., intermediate certificates, signatures, inclusion proofs); produced or cached by the untrusted host running the TEE.

Reference values: the policy that determines the acceptable range of values that the client trusts (e.g., TCB version number, individual measurements, etc.); hardcoded in the client code, or obtained over some trustworthy channel.

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Last updated 6 months ago